ABOUT CATALINK

A history of nuclear hotlines and an overview of the CATALINK initiative

OVERVIEW

The CATALINK Brief

The CATALINK communications system is an internationally-driven, secure, and resilient communications solution that has the potential to avert catastrophes amidst rising tensions between adversaries. CATALINK would build on the “hotline” model of previous generations, and rely on open-source technologies to maximize user integrity and trust.

ARCHITECTURE

The CATALINK Components

CATALINK is a novel approach to a modern, hotline-style crisis communication system that allows leaders of nuclear-armed states to communicate with each other – built to be secure, resilient, and trusted from the silicon up.

The Puck

A simple, secure, and robust device meant for dedicated communication between global leaders and officials during a nuclear crisis or other high-stakes event, like disaster response. Designed on an open-source platform, it will send trusted messages in minutes.

The Broker

An interface between the Puck and the ROCCS, which determines the path of the Puck message throughout the desired network. The Broker will switch networks as needed, including between satellites, commercial networks, fiber-optic lines, and high-frequency or low-frequency radio bands. If/when all other options fail or are compromised, it can fall back to the ROCCS mesh network.

The ROCCS

Resilient Omni Frequency Crisis Communications System

A permanently active network that utilizes multiple channels and wavelengths to ensure reliable relays of Puck messages. The ROCCS is one of a variety of redundant networks through which the Puck messages may travel, depending on availability, the threat environment, and the type of message sent.

ORIGINS

Origins of CATALINK

The concept for CATALINK emerged during a workshop the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) convened at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution in 2019. The workshop, hosted in collaboration with Stanford’s Preventive Defense Project and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, brought together multinational nuclear policymakers, academics, current and former senior decision-makers, and experts from the technology sector for discussions on global nuclear communications. Participants highlighted the technical vulnerability of communication systems–and discussed the potential solutions that could reinforce resilience and trust. A synthesis report from that workshop can be read here.

The unique combination of policymakers and technologists was critical to CATALINK’s origins. Today, that same mix continues to be a crucial source of advice and development for the blueprint of the CATALINK system.

Eric Grosse, former Vice-President, Security Engineering in Google has been instrumental in designing and developing the code of the Puck, and the code of Puck is accessible in open-source platforms like Github.

CONTEXT

Why are crisis communications important to nuclear risk reduction?

Any use of nuclear weapons, intentional or accidental, could have catastrophic consequences that impact all global citizens, not just those in nuclear-armed states. To reduce the risk of catastrophe we must provide decision-makers with every possible offramp. Crisis communications have historically been an essential tool to provide redundant and reliable channels of trust and security between nuclear-armed states, allowing for explanation, warning, and negotiation. Thus, nuclear-armed states need every possible tool available to promote trust, confidence, and accountability for nuclear risk reduction measures.

Nuclear-armed states, non-nuclear-armed states, and civil society organizations have frequently emphasized the importance of crisis communications in reducing nuclear escalation risks, and many highlight the need to enhance the resilience and number of connections between states. As stated in a variety of documents from the United Nations, the United States government, and coalitions of non-nuclear states, the consensus is clear: the world needs more secure multilateral hotlines. CATALINK could serve as a blueprint for what these improved channels could look like.

“Nuclear-Weapon States to improve or establish crisis communication and protocol among each other, e.g. by hotlines and risk reduction centres.”

“…the nuclear-weapon States commit to the following immediate measures:… To create and enhance effective crisis prevention and management tools, including notification and data exchange agreements, enhanced leader-to-leader and military-to-military contact, the establishment of crisis-proof communication lines and risk reduction centres.”

“We should also partner with regional governments and businesses to build scalable and resilient energy infrastructure, invest in critical mineral access, and harden existing and future cyber communications networks that take full advantage of American encryption and security potential.”

HISTORY

History of Nuclear Hotlines

After the world came to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the two superpowers did not have the ability to communicate effectively and swiftly in moments of crisis. To address this issue, officials set up the first nuclear direct communication link (DCL), or “hotline” between American and Soviet leaders in June 1963. 

Building on the success of the US-Soviet direct line, other nuclear-armed states like France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, and China later established various political and military leadership crisis communication channels with other nuclear and non-nuclear-armed states. States later adopted domain-specific hotlines such as the US-Russia and US-China space and cyber links.

1960s
1963
The US-Soviet hotline begins operation
United States representative N. Stelle and his Soviet Union counterpart M. Tsarapkin sign an agreement to set up a hot line communications link between the two superpowers, Geneva, 20 June 1963.
United States representative N. Stelle (left) and his Soviet Union counterpart M. Tsarapkin (right) sign an agreement to set up a hot line communications link between the two superpowers, Geneva, 20 June 1963. Photo: AFP
1966
The Soviet-French hotline begins operation
1967
The Soviet-British hotline begins operation
1967
The US-Soviet hotline is used during the Six-Day War between Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel
1970s
1971
The United States and the Soviet Union sign the Accidents Measures Agreement to establish notification protocols for nuclear-related accidents using the hotline
1972
The United States and Soviet Union sign the Incidents at Sea Agreement, requiring prompt communication related to maritime activities
Image depicting Russian Frigate Yaroslav Mudry (FF-777) before the ship’s hull number was changed.
Image depicting Russian Frigate Yaroslav Mudry (FF-777) before the ship’s hull number was changed. Photo: RIA Novosti
1980s
1987
The United States and Soviet Union establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs)
Then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz (seated, right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze sign the first NRRC Agreement, September 15, 1987.
Then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz (seated, right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze sign the first NRRC Agreement, September 15, 1987. Photo: US Department of State
1990s
1998
The Russia-China hotline begins operation
1998
The United States-China hotline begins operation
2000s
2004
The India-Pakistan hotline begins operation
2008
The United States and Russia establish a dedicated computer network for the hotline, enabling email communication for the first time
2010s
2010
The India-China hotline begins operation
Flag connections illustration
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, (right) with Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna (left) at Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing on Wednesday. Photo: China Daily
2015
The United States and Russia set up the Syria deconfliction line — a military-to-military channel to prevent accidental clashes in Syria
2015
The US-Indian hotline begins operation
2015
The US-Chinese space hotline begins operation
Flag connections illustration
The Qingzhou cargo spacecraft test vehicle is launched aboard the Lijian-2 Y1 carrier rocket, northwest China, March 30, 2026. Photo: VCG

For a full account of all direct political and military links between nuclear-armed states, view IST’s Atlas of Crisis Communications.

FAQS

Frequently Asked Questions

Learn more about CATALINK, the technical specifications, how it fits in the strategic landscape, and what’s next for the effort

What is CATALINK?

The CATALINK project builds an open source, additive, multilateral crisis communication technology for use by the leaders of nuclear weapons states. If implemented, CATALINK would build on the “hotline” model of previous generations, and rely on internationally-driven open-source technologies to maximize user integrity and trust.

The Puck

A simple, secure, and robust device meant for dedicated communication between global leaders and officials during a nuclear crisis or other high-stakes events like disaster response. Designed with an open-source platform, the Puck will send text messages in minutes.

The Broker

An interface between the puck and the ROCCS which determines the path of the Puck message throughout the desired network.

The ROCCS (Resilient Omni Frequency Crisis Communications System)

A permanently active global mesh network, the ROCCS uses multiple channels/wavelengths to ensure reliable message relays; one of a variety of redundant networks for puck messages to use depending on availability, the threat environment, and the type of message sent.

Not every country with nuclear weapons has a direct leader or military communication line with every other country with nuclear weapons. Additionally, there are no multilateral hotlines between states with nuclear weapons. Unlike the Cold War when security concerns were largely focused on one bilateral conflictual dyad, 21st century challenges are increasingly complex with multiple strategic competitors. CATALINK is an additive measure, not meant to replace existing hotlines but to add other resilient options for leaders to communicate before, during, and after a conflict or nuclear war.

Existing hotlines may be vulnerable to kinetic threats, such as environmental degradation or destruction during conflict, or non-kinetic threats such as cyber attacks and electronic warfare. New technological developments that could further destabilize communications (e.g. AI-generated audio and video) must also now be taken into account when thinking of how to improve resiliency, especially in a degraded security environment where miscommunication and misperceptions can flourish.

THE TEAM

Staff & Advisors

The team continues to drive progress on developing a blueprint for a last-resort, secure crisis communications channel

TESTIMONIALS

From the Field

Hear what our team, advisors, funders, and officials have to say about the CATALINK initiative

MENU

GET IN TOUCH

Email: catalink@securityandtechnology.org
Send us a message: Contact

JOIN THE CATALINK MAILING LIST